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I. INTRODUCTION
In August 2016, the American Bar Association (ABA) approved
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g). Under the amendment, it
is misconduct for an attorney to “engage in conduct that the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on
the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability,
age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or
socioeconomic status in conduct related to the practice of law.”
Comment [4] explains that:
Conduct related to the practice of law includes representing
clients; interacting with witnesses, coworkers, court
personnel, lawyers and others while engaged in the practice
of law; operating or managing a law firm or law practice;
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and participating in bar association, business or social
activities in connection with the practice of law.
The model rule [wa]s just that—a model that did not apply in any
jurisdiction.1
In 2017, I wrote an article in the GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
about Model Rule 8.4(g).2 I urged the states to hesitate before adopting this
provision. First, I noted that the expanded scope of Rule 8.4(g)—”conduct
related to the practice of law . . . would . . . inevitably chill speech on matters of
public concern.”3 Second, I wrote that Rule 8.4(g) regulates conduct “with only
the most tenuous connection to representation of clients, a lawyer’s fitness, or
the administration of justice.”4 Third, I observed that Rule 8.4(g) “imposes an
unlawful form of viewpoint discrimination.”5 I closed by “offering three simple
tweaks to the comments accompanying Rule 8.4(g) that would still serve the
drafters’ purposes, but provide stronger protection for free speech.”6
This essay will provide a brief overview of how the states have responded to
ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). Part I reviews opinions from four state attorneys
general who concluded that the rule is unconstitutional: Texas, South Carolina,
Louisiana, and Tennessee. Part II discusses the states that considered the rule
with modifications. Part III reviews the states that considered Rule 8.4(g) as
drafted. So far, only one state adopted the rule: Vermont. However, the process
is still not over, and other states are currently considering the rule.
II. FOUR STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL CONCLUDED MODEL RULE 8.4(G) WAS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Four state attorneys general have concluded that Model Rule 8.4(g) is
unconstitutional. Specifically, they found the rule violates the Freedom of
Speech, Exercise, and Association, and also runs afoul of the Due Process
Clause.
A. Texas
In December 2016, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton issued an opinion
titled, “Whether adoption of the American Bar Association’s Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 8.4(g) would constitute a violation of an attorney’s

1. Myles V. Link, Report to House of Delegates, Revised Resolution 109, 2016 A.B.A. SEC.
CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 1, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative
/professional_responsibility/final_revised_resolution_and_report_109.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K2XB-T76E].
2. Josh Blackman, Reply: A Pause for State Courts Considering Model Rule 8.4(g), 30 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 241 (2017).
3. Id. at 242.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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statutory or constitutional rights.”7 In this opinion, Paxton concluded that the
rule as drafted “raise[s] serious concerns about the constitutionality of the
restrictions it would place on members of the State Bar and the resulting harm
to the clients they represent.”8 Specifically,
[g]iven the broad nature of this rule, a court could apply it to an
attorney’s participation in a continuing legal education panel
discussion, authoring a law review article, or informal conversations
at a bar association event.… [F]or example, … candid dialogues about
illegal immigration, same-sex marriage, or restrictions on bathroom
usage will likely involve discussions about national origin, sexual
orientation, and gender identity. Model Rule 8.4(g) would subject
many participants in such dialogue to discipline, and it will therefore
suppress thoughtful and complete exchanges about these complex
issues.9
Paxton also observed that the rule
could . . . be applied to restrict an attorney’s religious liberty and
prohibit an attorney from zealously representing faith-based groups.
For example, . . . [i]f an individual takes an action based on a sincerelyheld religious belief and is sued for doing so, an attorney may be
unwilling to represent that client in court for fear of being accused of
discrimination under the rule.10
The Attorney General also concluded that Rule 8.4(g) runs afoul of the freedom
of association, is unconstitutionally overboard, and is void for vagueness. 11
Texas has not adopted Model Rule 8.4(g).
B. South Carolina
South Carolina Solicitor General Robert D. Cook reached a similar conclusion
in May 2017.12 His opinion favorably cited Paxton’s analysis concerning the
First Amendment, and that of Professors Ronald Rotunda and Eugene Volokh.13
Likewise, the Professional Responsibility Committee of the South Carolina Bar
opposed the adoption of Rule 8.4(g).14 The Committee found that the rule’s

7. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. KP-0123 (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www2.texasattorneygeneral.gov/
opinions/opinions/51paxton/op/2016/kp0123.pdf [https://perma.cc/M248- HKGG].
8. Id. at 3.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 4–6.
12. S.C. Att’y Gen. Op. Letter at 13 (May 1, 2017), http://www.scag.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/McCravy-J.-OS10143-FINAL-Opinion-5-1-2017-01331464xD2C7801336400xD2C78.pdf [https://perma.cc/ED72-3UGM].
13. Id. at 5–8.
14. Id. at 11.
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vagueness ran afoul of basic due process guarantees. 15 The South Carolina
Supreme Court declined to adopt the proposal.16
C. Louisiana
In September 2017, Louisiana Attorney General Jeff Landry also found that
Model Rule 8.4(g) was unconstitutional.17 He found that the rule is a “contentbased regulation which has the effect of suppressing a lawyer’s conduct, actions,
and speech in an array of areas and settings outside a lawyer’s professional
practice.”18 Critically, it would apply to “a private interaction . . . at a social
activity sponsored by a law firm or bar association.”19 The opinion concluded
that the rule “likely . . . violates a lawyer’s freedom of speech under the First
Amendment.”20 Moreover, the attorney general found that the law runs afoul of
the freedom of exercise: “a lawyer who acts as a legal advisor on the board of
their church would be engaging in professional misconduct if they participated
in a march against same-sex marriage or taught a class at their religious
institution against divorce (i.e., marital status).” 21 Ultimately, the rule was
somewhat unprecedented: anti-bias rules in other states were “narrower in scope
than ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).”22 Also, the Attorney General found, “[t]here has
been no demonstration that there is a need for” the proposed rule. 23 The
Louisiana Bar rejected the proposal.24
D. Tennessee
In March 2018, the Tennessee Attorney General also found that Rule 8.4(g)
“would violate the constitutional rights of Tennessee attorneys and conflict with

15. Id.
16. Order, In re Proposed Amendments to Rule 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (S.C.
June
20,
2017)
(No.
2017-000498),
https://www.sccourts.org/courtOrders/displayOrder.cfm?orderNo=2017-06-20-01 (declining “to
incorporate ABA Model Rule 8.4 within Rule 8.4, RPC, as requested by the ABA.”).
17. La. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 17-00114 at 9 (Sept. 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/9TWR-8GY9
(opining that ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g) and LSBA proposed Rule 8.4(g)
violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution) [hereinafter La.
Att’y Gen. Op.].
18. Id. at 5.
19. Id. at 6.
20. Id. at 5.
21. Id. at 7.
22. Id. at 4.
23. Id. at 9.
24. LSBA Rules Committee Votes Not to Proceed Further with Subcommittee
Recommendations Re: ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), LA. STATE BAR ASS’N,
https://www.lsba.org/BarGovernance/CommitteeInfo.aspx?Committee=01fa2a5
9-9030-4a8c9997-32eb7978c892 [https://perma.cc/74SP-Z3TH] (last visited Oct. 12, 2019) [hereinafter LSBA
Rules Comm. Votes No].
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the existing Rules of Professional Conduct.”25 He explained that the rule “would
profoundly transform the professional regulation of Tennessee attorneys. It
would regulate aspects of an attorney’s life that are far removed from protecting
clients, preventing interference with the administration of justice, ensuring
attorneys’ fitness to practice law, or other traditional goals of professional
regulation.”26 In particular, the rule would “chill attorneys from representing
clients who wish to advocate positions that could be considered harassment or
discrimination based on a protected characteristic, or at least from doing so
zealously as required by the Rules of Professional Conduct.”27 I will discuss the
proceedings in Tennessee infra Part III.F.
III. STATES THAT CONSIDERED MODEL RULE 8.4(G) WITH MODIFICATIONS
At least six states considered Model Rule 8.4(g) with certain modifications.
These changes were designed to address possible constitutional concerns with
the rule.
A. Maine
In May 2018, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court invited comments on the
proposed amendment to Maine Rules of Professional Conduct.28 The proposed
amendment would adopt ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) with “some modifications.”29
For example, the proposal “omitted from the list of types of prohibited
discrimination ‘marital status’ and ‘socioeconomic status.’”30 I commented on
the proposal.31 I wrote:
While the suggested “modifications” alleviate some of my concerns,
the rule should still be rejected. First, defining “harassment” as
“demeaning conduct” can still sweep in a wide range of
constitutionally protected speech. Second, because the phrase “related
to the practice of law” still includes “interacting with . . . coworkers,”
25. Tenn. Att’y Gen. Comment Letter No. ADM2017-02244 Opposing Proposed Rule of
Professional
Conduct
8.4(g)
1
(Mar.
16,
2018),
https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/foi/rule84g/comments-3-162018.pdf.
26. Id. at 2. The opinion also cited my article in the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics,
though it referred to me as “John Blackman.” Id. at n.2.
27. Id. at 11.
28. Notice of Opportunity for Comment, ME. SUP. JUD. CT. (May 22, 2018),
https://www.courts.maine.gov/rules_adminorders/rules/proposed/2018-522/prof_conduct_notice_2018-5-22.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2019).
29. Proposed Amendment to the Maine Rules of Prof’l Conduct, ME. SUP. JUD. CT.,
https://www.courts.maine.gov/rules_adminorders/rules/proposed/2018-522/mr_prof_conduct_proposed_amends_2018-5-22.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2019).
30. Id.
31. Letter from Josh Blackman, Assoc. Professor, S. Tex. Coll. of L. Hous., to Matthew
Pollack,
Exec.
Clerk,
Me.
Supreme
Judicial
Court
(May
29,
2018),
https://courts.maine.gov/rules_adminorders/rules/proposed/2018-5-22/comments/blackman.pdf.
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an attorney’s speech at bar functions could still give rise to
discipline.32
To date, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court has not yet acted on the petition.
B. Louisiana
The Louisiana State Bar Association requested written comments concerning
ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). The Subcommittee did not suggest adopting ABA
Model Rule 8.4(g) in its entirety. Instead, it proposed adopting the rule with
several modifications.33 I wrote a letter in response in which I proposed several
additional modifications.34
First, whereas the ABA’s rule concerns “conduct related to the
practice of law,” the recommended rule concerns “conduct in
connection with the practice of law.” The subcommittee noted that
this modification “clearly limits application of the rule to conduct of a
lawyer.” With respect, this is a distinction without a difference. There
is no linguistic difference between “related to the practice of law” and
“in connection with the practice of law.” These phrases have the same
meaning.
...
Second, whereas the ABA’s Model Rule prohibits “harassment or
discrimination,” the recommended rule prohibits “discrimination
prohibited by law.” The former rule defines “harassment” to include
“derogatory or demeaning verbal . . . conduct.” This provision raises
distinct Free Speech concerns. As then-Judge Alito observed, there is
no “categorical harassment exception” to the First Amendment. The
Subcommittee’s modification is an important one, as it omits the
phrase “harassment . . . .”35
In November 2017, the Rules of Professional Conduct Committee of the
Louisiana State Bar Association declined to adopt the rule. 36 Likewise, the
Louisiana District Attorneys Association opposed the rule. 37 The Louisiana
Attorney General also concluded that the rule was unconstitutional. 38
32. Id.
33. LSBA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT COMM., RULE 8.4 SUBCOMM. REPORT 9–11 (Mar. 24,
2017), http://files.lsba.org/documents/News/LSBANews/RPCSubFinalReport.pdf (last visited
Oct. 13, 2019).
34. Letter from Josh Blackman, Assoc. Professor, S. Tex. Coll. of L. Hous., to Richard P.
Lemmler, Jr., Ethics Counsel, La. State Bar Ass’n (Aug. 18, 2017) (on file with author).
35. Id.
36. LSBA Rules Comm. Votes No, supra note 24.
37. Letter from E. Pete Adams, Exec. Dir., La. State Dist. Attorney’s Ass’n., to Dona Kay
Renegar,
President,
La.
State
Bar
Ass’n
(Aug.
31,
2017),
https://www.christianlegalsociety.org/sites/default/files/site_files/Louisiana%20DAs%20Propose
d%20New%20Disciplinary%20Rule%208.4h.pdf.
38. La. Att’y Gen. Op., supra note 17.
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Ultimately, the Louisiana State Bar Association Rules of Professional Conduct
Committee voted to not proceed with the rule.
C. Idaho
The Idaho State Bar Association proposed adopting ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)
with modifications.39 In September 2018, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the
resolution. Though it did not pass on the rule’s constitutionality, the Chief
Justices explained, “[m]embers of the Court encourage the Idaho State Bar to
revisit this matter in hopes of narrowing the rule to comport with new United
States Supreme Court cases.”40
D. New Hampshire
During a June 1, 2018 hearing, the New Hampshire Supreme Court Advisory
Committee on Rules considered three proposed rules that are very similar to
ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).41 I submitted a letter.42 I noted that
[e]ach of the proposed rules raise the same significant First
Amendment issues as does the model rule. For example, proposed
comment 6 only protects “a lawyer’s rights of free speech . . . in a
manner that is consistent with these Rules.” This protection is hollow,
because engaging in “free speech” that is not “consistent with these
Rules” would put an attorney at risk of disciplinary.43
In September 2018, the Committee recommended that a version of the rule
should be adopted.44 Another hearing may be scheduled.
E. Pennsylvania
In October 2016, the Pennsylvania Bar Association Women in the Profession
Commission (WIP) proposed adopting Rule 8.4(g).45 The Disciplinary Board
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the rule was too broad. It
39. Letter from Roger S. Burdick, Chief Justice, Idaho Supreme Court, to Diane Minnich,
Exec. Dir., Idaho State Bar (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.clsreligiousfreedom.org
/sites/default/files/site_files/ISC%20Letter%20-%20IRPC%208.4(g).pdf.
40. Id.
41. Advisory Comm. on Rules, Public Hearing Notice, N.H. SUP. CT. (Apr. 3, 2018),
https://www.courts.state.nh.us/committees/adviscommrules/Public-Hearing-Notice-0618.pdf (last
visited Dec. 16, 2019).
42. Letter from Josh Blackman, Assoc. Professor, S. Tex. Coll. of L. Hous., to Chief Justice
Robert J. Lynn, N.H. Supreme Court (May 29, 2018), https://www.courts.state.nh.us/
committees/adviscommrules/dockets/2016/2016-009/2016-009-Rule-of-Prof-Conduct-8-4-05-29letter-from-Professor-Blackman.pdf.
43. Id.
44. Advisory Comm. on Rules, Minutes of Public Meeting, N.H. SUP. CT. (Sept. 7, 2018),
https://www.courts.state.nh.us/committees/adviscommrules/sept-7-2018m.pdf.
45. PA. BAR ASS’N, WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION COMM’N, AMENDED RECOMMENDATION
AND
REPORT
2,
https://www.christianlegalsociety.org/sites/default/files/site_files/
PA%20WIP%20Proposal.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2019).
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invited comments on the proposed amendment to Pennsylvania Rule of
Professional Conduct (RPC) 8.4 relating to misconduct.46 The Board did not
recommend adopting the rule “wholesale.” 47 The Board recognized that, as
drafted, Model Rule 8.4(g) is “susceptible to challenges related to constitutional
rights of lawyers, such as freedom of speech, association and religion.” 48
Therefore, the Board proposed the adoption of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) with
several modifications.49 These changes are a step in the right direction, but do
not cure its constitutional faults. I wrote a letter in response to the modified
rule.50
“In the Practice of Law”
The Board recognized that the “broad scope of the language
‘conduct related to the practice of law’” in the Model Rule could
extend to “lawyers ‘participating in bar association, business or social
activities in connection with the practice of law.’” Specifically, the
Board expressed “grave concerns that adoption of such language
would unconstitutionally chill lawyers’ speech in forums disconnected
from the provision of legal services.” Therefore, the Board proposed
an alternative: “‘in the practice of law’ as a more narrowly-tailored
scope of prohibited conduct.” The Board conclude[d] that private
activities are not intended to be covered by this proposed rule
amendment, since to do so would increase the likelihood of infringing
on constitutional rights of lawyers.”
This modification is a positive development. By narrowing the
scope of Rule 8.4(g), the Board has expressly excluded speech that
may arise in “conduct related to the practice of law,” such as “social
activities.” Yet, this modification still raises constitutional concerns.
And these concerns were highlighted by the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra.
NIFLA considered whether California could require certain medical
facilities (both licensed and unlicensed) to display messages
concerning the availability of public funding for abortions.
In recent years, several circuit courts of appeals have strictly
regulated speech associated with a regulated profession—that is
“professional speech”—when “it involves personalized services and
46. Proposed Amendments to the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct Regarding
Misconduct, PA. BULL. (May 19, 2018), https://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol48/4820/773.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2019).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Letter from Josh Blackman, Assoc. Professor, S. Tex. Coll. of L. Hous., to the
Disciplinary
Bd.
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Pa.
(July
13,
2018),
https://www.christianlegalsociety.org/sites/default/files/site_files/Letter-PennsylvaniaBlackman.pdf.
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requires a professional license from the State.” However, such a
regime, the Supreme Court explained, “gives the States unfettered
power to reduce a group’s First Amendment rights by simply imposing
a licensing requirement.” The Court expressed caution with applying
laxer scrutiny to so-called “professional speech,” as that standard
“would cover a wide array of individuals—doctors, lawyers, nurses,
physical therapists, truck drivers, bartenders, barbers, and many
others.” Stated simply, the government lacks an “unfettered power”
to regulate the speech of “lawyers,” simply because they provide
“personalize[d] services” after receiving a “professional license.”
The Court identified two narrow exceptions to this rule, “neither of
which turned on the fact that professionals were speaking.” In the first
circumstance, the Court has “applied more deferential review to some
laws that require professionals to disclose factual, noncontroversial
information in their ‘commercial speech.’” This first condition is not
relevant to the Proposed Amendments: Speech uttered “in the practice
of law” does not “require professionals to disclose factual,
noncontroversial information.”
Second, the Court noted that “[s]tates may regulate professional
conduct, even though that conduct incidentally involves speech.” This
standard is directly relevant to the proposed rule: the state can
“regulate professional conduct . . . that . . . incidentally involves
speech,” but it cannot regulate speech that incidentally involves
professional conduct. The Proposed Amendment, by its own terms,
straddles that line. It applies to both “conduct” “in the practice of law”
and “words” (that is speech) “in the practice of law.” If the Board
struck the phrase “words,” and focused solely on “conduct” “in the
practice of law,” the Proposed Rule would potentially fall within the
second exception identified in NIFLA. But as drafted, the regulation
of “words” would be subject to traditional strict scrutiny.
Given that this Proposed Rule is subject to strict scrutiny, members
of the Bar would be faced with a notoriously vague standard:
[s]pecifically, what “words” are “in the practice of law?” The Bulletin
explains, “Pennsylvania RPC and the Pennsylvania Rules of
Disciplinary Enforcement do not define what constitutes the practice
of law.” Rather, “the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has explained
what specific activities constitute the practice of law on a case-by-case
basis.” Relying on a “case-by-case” regime is the very sort of ad hoc
standard that cannot meet strict scrutiny under the First Amendment.
In light of NIFLA, a content-based restriction applied to “words” “in
the practice of law” cannot satisfy the rigorous requirements of strict
scrutiny. This rule could possibly be cured by limiting its reach to
“conduct in the practice of law” (that is, excluding mere “words”). A
more precise fix would limit the Rule’s reach to “conduct in the
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representation of a client.” This approach, which has been adopted in
other jurisdictions, would further shrink the nexus between the
conduct at issue, and the scope of the Bar’s jurisdiction. Both of these
standards would “regulate professional conduct, even though that
conduct incidentally involves speech.” They would not regulate
speech, that incidentally involves “professional conduct.”
“Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment”
Pennsylvania’s proposed rule does not define the terms bias,
prejudice, and harassment. Indeed, it defines those terms by repeating
those terms: “in the practice of law, by words or conduct, knowingly
manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in harassment, including but not
limited to bias, prejudice, or harassment.” There is no way for a
member of the Bar, to know, in advance, whether his or her speech
manifests “bias,” “prejudice,” or “harassment,” since those terms are
not defined in the rule itself. Proposed comment three offers
“examples of manifestations of bias or prejudice,” but notes that the
list is not comprehensive. (Indeed, several of the items listed, such as
“demeaning nicknames” and “attempted humor based on stereotypes”
would be expressly protected by the First Amendment.) Proposed
comment four defines harassment as “verbal or physical conduct that
denigrates or shows hostility or aversion toward a person on bases
such as race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability,
age, sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or
political affiliation.” The comment provides no guidance of what
renders “[v]erbal” “conduct,” that is speech, “denigrat[ing]” or
“show[ing] hostility or aversion.” Given that this rule, as interpreted
by the comments, is regulating not only “professional conduct,” but
also “words,” this content-based restriction would fail the void-forvagueness standard.
“Knowingly Manifest Bias or Prejudice”
ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) applies to those who “engage in conduct
that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment.” The
proposed Amendment applies a more stringent mens rea standard: one
who “knowingly manifest[s] bias or prejudice, or engage[s] in
harassment.” This is a positive development, and would exclude
situations where the subjective feelings of a listener may result in an
ethics violation. The misconduct must be knowing, and deliberate.
However, this change does not cure the Proposed Amendment’s other
constitutional faults discussed supra.51

51. Id.
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1. Status
In May 2018, the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
rejected the rule: “[f]ollowing extensive review and discussion of the numerous
comments,” it had “determined not to move forward with the proposed
amendments, and renewed its study of the issue.”52 The Board proposed a new
version of the rule in June 2018.53 It is currently under consideration.
F. Tennessee
In November 2017, the Board of Professional Responsibility of the Tennessee
Supreme Court and the Tennessee Bar Association petitioned the Tennessee
Supreme Court to adopt Rule 8.4(g) with several modifications. 54 The
Tennessee Attorney General concluded that the rule was unconstitutional.55 I
also submitted a letter, and applauded three additions to the rule.56
First, the proposed comment [4] offers a definition of the phrase
“legitimate advocacy” for the proposed RPC 8.4(g):
Legitimate advocacy protected by Section (g) includes
advocacy in any conduct related to the practice of the law,
including circumstances where a lawyer is not representing
a client and outside traditional settings where a lawyer acts
as an advocate, such as litigation.
This comment could be improved by providing some context of what
those non-traditional settings are. This sentence, which I suggest in
my article, would suffice: “For example, this Rule does not apply to
speech on matters of public concern at bar association functions,
continuing legal education classes, law school classes, and other
similar forums.’” This addition would clarify that an attorney’s
speech in the context of a lecture, debate, or CLE class, on a matter of
public concern, would not amount to disciplinable conduct.
Second, proposed comment [4a] includes additional protections for
free speech. It provides:
[4a] Section (g) does not restrict any speech or conduct not
related to the practice of law, including speech or conduct
protected by the First Amendment. Thus, a lawyer’s speech

52. PA. BULL., supra note 45.
53. Id.
54. Order, In re Petition for the Adoption of a New Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 8.4(g), (Tenn.
Apr. 23, 2018) (No. ADM2017-02244), https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/
order_denying_8.4g_petition_.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HBN-7TAA] [hereinafter Tenn. Order].
55. Tenn. Att’y Gen., supra note 25, at 9.
56. Letter from Josh Blackman, Assoc. Professor, S. Tex. Coll. of L. Hous., to Hon. James
Hivner, Supreme Court of Tenn. (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/
6_blackman_cmt_to_tenn_sup_ct.pdf.
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or conduct unrelated to the practice of law cannot violate
this Section.
I also applaud this addition. It could be improved even further by
replacing the first sentence with one used in an earlier draft of ABA
Model Rule 8.4(g) from 2015, but was ultimately removed (see pp.
248–49 of my article). The comment provides: “This Rule does not
apply to conduct protected by the First Amendment, as a lawyer does
retain a ‘private sphere’ where personal opinion, freedom of
association, religious expression, and political speech is protected by
the First Amendment and not subject to this rule.” Making this change
would clarify that not only are values of free speech protected, but also
those of freedom of association, as well as freedom of exercise.
Third, proposed comment [5b] excludes a provision that was
included in ABA Model Rule 8.4(g):
A lawyer may charge and collect reasonable fees and
expenses for a representation. Rule 1.5(a).
Rather, comment [5d] expands on this sentiment by clarifying that
charging fees does not amount to discrimination on the basis of
socioeconomic status:
Nevertheless, a lawyer does not engage in conduct that
harasses or discriminates based on socioeconomic status
merely by charging and collecting reasonable fees and
expenses for a representation.
I applaud this addition, which retains the right of an attorney to set
“reasonable fees,” without fear of a bar complaint.57
The Tennessee Bar adopted several of my comments verbatim and proposed
a revised rule.58 Bloomberg BNA observed, “[t]hose revisions focused on trying
to avoid confusion and clarify the legitimate advocacy exception and that the

57. Id.
58. Comment of the Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
and the Tennessee Bar Association, In re Petition for the Adoption of a New Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8,
RPC 8.4(g), No. ADM2017-02244 (Tenn. Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.christianlegalsociety.org/
sites/default/files/site_files/TBA%20and%20BPR%20Comment%20Amending%20Proposed%20
Language%2003-21-2018.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2019).
The Board of Professional
Responsibility and the Tennessee Bar Association:
amend[ed] their joint proposed language for a new Rule 8.4(g) in response to, and to
accommodate a number of, the constructive suggestions for the improvement of the
proposed Rule made by Professor Josh Blackman of the South Texas College of Law and
the Knoxville Bar Association. Professor Blackman’s comments, filed by email on
December 11, 2017, included praise for certain aspects of Petitioner’s modifications of
the ABA Model Rule and several specific suggestions for further improvement.
Id.
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rule does not apply to conduct protected by the First Amendment.”59 In April
2018, the Tennessee Supreme Court rejected the petition.60
IV. STATES THAT CONSIDERED MODEL RULE 8.4(G) AS DRAFTED
At least four states considered ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) without any
modifications.
A. Vermont
Vermont was the first, and so far, only state to adopt ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)
as drafted.61 It did so in 2017, quietly and “without discernable opposition.”62
Indeed, in one important regard, the Vermont Supreme Court “made the rule’s
restrictions on lawyers even greater.” 63 The ABA’s proposed rule does not
apply to a decision to make an otherwise discretionary withdrawal from a
representation. However, Vermont’s rule provides that “[t]he optional grounds
for withdrawal set out in Rule 1.16(b) must also be understood in light of Rule
8.4(g). They cannot be based on discriminatory or harassing intent without
violating that rule.”64 In other words, it would be misconduct for an attorney to
withdraw from a representation, if doing so would violate Rule 8.4(g). Vermont
is very much an outlier.
B. Arizona
In February 2017, the Central Arizona Chapter of the National Lawyers Guild
petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court to adopt ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).65 I

59. Mindy Rattan, Tennessee Again Rejects Anti-Discrimination Ethics Rule, BLOOMBERG
BNA (May 1, 2018), https://www.bna.com/tennessee-again-rejects-n57982091727/.
60. Tenn. Order, supra note 53.
61. Order Promulgating Amendments to the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct (Vt. July
14,
2017),
https://www20.vermontjudiciary.org/sites/default/files/documents/
PROMULGATEDVRPrP8.4(g).pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8AU-8KHU].
62. Andrew Strickler, Vermont’s Anti-Bias Rule Vote an Outlier in Heated Debate, LAW 360
(Aug. 14, 2017, 9:30 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/953530/vermont-s-anti-bias-rulevote-an- outlier-in-heated-debate [https://perma.cc/LRK9-93WD] (last visited Feb. 27, 2019).
63. Michael S. McGinniss, Expressing Conscience with Candor: Saint Thomas More and
First Freedoms in the Legal Profession, 42 HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y 173, 213 n.165 (2019).
64. Id.
65. Petition by National Lawyers Guild of Central Arizona, In re Petition to Amend ER 8.4,
Rule 42, Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court (Ariz. Feb. 3, 2017) (No. R-17-0032),
https://www.christianlegalsociety.org/sites/default/files/site_files/2017%20National%20Lawyer%
20Guild%20Petition%20to%20Amend%20Rule%208.4(g)[1].pdf.
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submitted a letter opposing the petition.66 That petition was denied on August
27, 2018.67
C. Nevada
In May 2017, The Board of Governors of the State Bar of Nevada petitioned
the Supreme Court of Nevada to amend its Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4 to
include the ABA’s Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g).68 In June 2017,
I submitted a letter opposing the proposed rule.69 In September 2017, the Board
of Governors of the State Bar withdrew the petition.70
D. Montana
The Montana Supreme Court accepted comments on Rule 8.4(g) through
April 2017.71 The Montana Legislature passed a joint resolution opposing the
constitutionality of Rule 8.4(g). 72 To date, the Montana Supreme Court has
taken no action on the rule.

66. Letter from Josh Blackman, Assoc. Professor, S. Tex. Coll. of L. Hous., to the Ariz.
Supreme Court (May 17, 2018), https://www.clsreligiousfreedom.org/sites/default/files/site_files/
Blackman%20Comment%20Letter.pdf.
67. Letter from Janet Johnson, Clerk, Ariz. Sup. Ct., Rule 42, ER 8.4, Rules of the Supreme
Court (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.clsnet.org/document.doc?id=1164.
68. Petition by Board of Governors of the State Bar of Nevada, In re Amendments to Rule of
Professional
Conduct
8.4,
(Nev.
May
8,
2017)
(No.
ADKT-0526),
https://www.scribd.com/document/351211057/In-the-Matter-of-Amendments-to-Rule-ofProfessional-Conduct-8-4-ADKT-No-0526.
69. Letter from Josh Blackman, Assoc. Professor, S. Tex. Coll. of L. Hous., to Elizabeth A.
Brown,
Clerk
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Nev.
(June
22,
2017),
https://www.scribd.com/document/351999517/Letter-from-Josh-Blackman-to-Nevada-SupremeCourt-concerning-Rule-8-4-g.
70. Order, In re Amendments to Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4, (Nev. Sept. 25, 2017) (No.
ADKT-0526),
https://www.nvbar.org/wp-content/uploads/ADKT-0526-withdraw-order.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6UPK-B9GU].
71. S.J. Res. 15, 65th Leg. (Mont. 2017), http://leg.mt.gov/bills/2017/BillPdf/SJ0015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9DRA-JSRG].
72. Id.

